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Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Contradictions and Challenges 
BY AKI-KWEfMARY ELLEN TURPEL 
"Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the su- 
premacy of God and the rule of law.. ." 
(Preamble to Part I, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) 
"Your religion was written upon tables of stone by the ironfinger ofyour 
God so that you could not forget. The Red Aboriginal people could never 
comprehend nor remember it. Our religion is the traditions of our ances- 
tors - the dreams of our old men, given them in solemn hours of night by 
the Great Spirit; and the visitions of our sachems: and it is written in the 
hearts of our people." 
(Chief Seattle to the Governor of Washington Territory, 1854) 
"When anthropologists, government ofJicials, and churchmen have ar- 
gued that our ways have been lost to us, they are fulfilling one of their own 
tribal rituals - wish fuljillment." 
(Chief George Manuel, The Fourth World) 
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T he contemporary world of Aboriginal politics is inhabited by discussions about rights - the right to self-government, the 
right to title to land, the right to equality, 
the right to social services, and the right to 
practice spiritual beliefs. None of this is 
very new, nor is it surprising, given that 
non-Aboriginal people have been writing 
on behalf of the 'rights' of Aboriginal 
People since the 16th century. 
The earliest of these works were con- 
cerned primarily with how the colonial 
powers (Spain) should treat the 'uncivi- 
lized' and savage peoples discovered in 
America.' Many would argue that there 
have been no real advances in 'rights' for 
Aboriginal people in America since the 
16th century, but to seek advances in 
'rights' presupposes the acceptance of 
terminology. It strikes me that when 
Aboriginal people discuss rights and bor- 
row the rhetoric of human rights in con- 
temporary struggle, we are using thepara- 
digm of human rights, both nationally and 
internationally, as an instrument for the 
many cases as the 'only' resort. Is that re- 
ally buying into the distinctly western and 
liberal vision of human rights concepts? 
Underlying the use of human rights 
terminology is a plea for recognition of a 
different way of life, a different idea of 
community, of politics, of spirituality - 
ideas which have existed since time 
immemorial, but which have been cast as 
differences to be repressed and dis- 
couraged since colonization. In asking for 
recognition by another culture of the exis- 
tence of your own, and for toleration of, 
and respect for, the practical difference 
that it brings with it, there seems to be 
something at stake which is larger than 
human rights, and certainly larger than 
the texts of particular documents which 
guarantee human rights, such as the Ca- 
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: 
a more basic request - the request to be 
recognized as peoples. I believe that from 
early colonization up to the present, no 
government or monarch has ever genu- 
inely recognized Aboriginal Peoples as 
distinct Peoples with cultures different 
from their own. In other words, as Peoples 
whose ways of life should be tolerated and 
respected, even though certain customs 
may challenge the cultural assumptions 
of the newcomers. 
I also believe that one reason for this, 
aside from the obvious one of the asser- 
tion of government power and the quest 
for economic dominance, is that Aborig- 
inal ways have been and still are pre- 
sumed to be primitive, in the sense of 
"lesser" states of development. This pre- 
sumption denies genuine differences by 
presuming that another culture is the same, 
just not quite as "civilized" yet. Hence, it 
is important for the colonial governments 
to take jurisdiction over Aboriginal 
Peoples in order to guide them to a more 
reasoned state of being where they can 
become just like them (it is not surprising 
here that the church was usually the state's 
best ally). 
No government has ever dealt with 
distinct peoples with 
cultures different from 
their own. 
Aboriginal Peoples on an equal basis - 
without seeing us as means to an eco- 
nomic goal (settlement anddevelopment), 
as noble savages, the pagans without civi- 
lization, or as specimens for anthropo- 
logical investigation and scientific col- 
le~tion.~ Genuinely recognizing another 
People as another culture is more than 
recognizing rights of certain persons. It's 
not simply recognizing Peoples of an- 
other colour, translatedinEuropean terms 
as "race," nor is it recognizing the pres- 
ence of a minority because the minority is 
always defined by and in subordination to 
the majority. Placing the emphasis on 
race or minority (and consequently on 
rights) has the effect of covering over the 
differences at work to the majority's 
advantage. Aboriginal cultures are not 
simply difference 'races' - a difference 
explained in terms of biology (or colour): 
Aboriginal cultures are the manifestat- 
ions of a different human (collective) 
imagination. 
To borrow the words of a non-Aborig- 
inal writer, [Aboriginal] cultures "are 
oriented as wholes in different directions. 
They are travelling along different roads 
in pursuit of different ends, and theseends 
and these means in one society cannot be 
judged in terms of those of another society 
because essentially they are incommen- 
surable...'" While it seems that, in the 
Canadian context, Aboriginal Peoples and 
non-Aboriginal persons have some un- 
derstanding and recognition of each other, 
it seems that Aboriginal Peoples have 
been the ones who have had to suffer for 
tolerance (even by force and impris- 
~nment).~ 
It is true that there have been treaties 
between Aboriginal Peoples and the Brit- 
ish Crown. However,thesedo notamount, 
in my view, to a genuine recognition of 
diverse Indigenous cultures; they were 
really Western-style (written in a highly 
legalistic form in most cases) methods to 
make way for progress, with "progress" 
defined according to the standards of the 
newcomers. After all, it was the British 
praedce In a Im ost J ,r h e  coIories, 
irrespective of cultural differences among 
those they 'discovered' or 'conquered.' It 
is no wonder then, that in studying the law 
of treaties, we quickly learn that, accord- 
ing to Anglo-Canadian legal standards, 
treaties (even before Confederation) are 
not seen as agreements between sover- 
eign Peoples or nations. When we inquire 
as to why treaties are not viewed as agree- 
ments between two (or more) sovereign 
Peoples, we are generally led to the theory 
that Aboriginal People (either at the time 
of treaty-making or now) were not suffi- 
ciently 'civilized' and organized to qual- 
ify as 'sovereign' Peoples, or that they 
had already 'lost' their sovereignty 
through some predestined and mysterious 
process (for example, by virtue of being 
"discovered"). 
Of course, there is no compelling rea- 
son, according to the doctrines and p ~ -  
ciples of international law, to view trea- 
ties between Aboriginal Peoples and the 
Crown as anything other than treaties 
between sovereigns, or internationaltrea- 
ties. Nor does there seem to be any com- 
pelling reason for continuing to pretend 
that Aboriginal Peoples do not have dis- 
tinct cultures, cultures which are deserv- 
ing of recognition by the dominant (Euro- 
pean) one which has been imposed in 
Canada. Why is it then that Aboriginal 
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Peoples, and Aboriginal claims, must be 
'fit-in' to the categories and concepts of a 
dominant culture, in some form of equiva- 
lence, in order to beacknowledged? There 
appears to be a contradiction at work in 
areas like human rights - that is, a contra- 
diction between pretending on the one 
hand to accept Aboriginal Peoples as 
distinct Peoples, and on the other of ac- 
cepting something called Aboriginal 
Peoples' rights.   his contradiction, which 
I explore briefly in the following pages, 
has lead to a great deal of misunderstand- 
ing, and has given the dominant culture 
(as represented by the government of 
Canada) plenty of scope in which to 
manoeuvre, while avoiding a difference- 
based approach to Aboriginal Peoples as 
equals or as sovereigns. 
'Aboriginal rights' are a category, pri- 
marily a category of law, in which most 
discussions about our historic claims and 
cultural differences are carried out in 
Canadian society. It is a category with 
severe limitations politically and legally; 
limitations which have been set, whether 
or notintentionally, by those who thought 
up the category- mostly non-Aboriginal 
people. It is a realm in which discussions 
focussing on strange expressions like 
'title,' 'usufructory rights,' 'mere prem- 
ises,' 'status,' 'refetential incorporation,' 
'extinguishment,' and 'existing' take on 
enormous significance, even though they 
do not seem to have anything to do with 
the everyday lives of Aboriginal people. 
A frightening and frustrating thing about 
the centrality of these expressions is that 
they were thought up by the same non- 
Aboriginal people that brought us the 
'rights' category: they seem incompatible 
with Aboriginal ideas about land, family, 
social life, and spirituality. Yet somehow 
they are supposed to be helping us out, 
assisting us in our struggle to continue to 
practice our cultures. Could it be that they 
just serve to limit the possibilities for gen- 
uine acknowledgement of the existence 
of Aboriginal Peoples as distinct cultures 
and political communities possessing the 
ability to live without external regulation 
and control? 
I chose the first two quotations prefac- 
ing this article to illustrate the contradic- 
tion here - a Charter based on the su- 
premacy of a foreign God and the (Anglo- 
American) rule of law just doesn't seem to 
be the kind of constitution that Aboriginal 
Peoples can get too excited about. Rather, 
it is the kind of constitution which we can 
get rather angry about because it has the 
effect of excluding Aboriginal vision(s) 
and (diverse) views about the land and the 
society now called Canada. Clearly, as a 
historical document, it represents only 
one story of Canada- that is, the story of 
the colonialists. As adocurnent held out to 
be the "supreme law of Canada" (accord- 
ing to Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 
1982), it represents an act of ethno-cen- 
trism and domination, acknowledging at 
no point The Great Law of customary 
laws of the First Peoples of this territory 
(except unless through wish-fulfillment 
section 35 is read this way).5 
Could Aboriginal spirituality ever be 
ists.. .it represents an 
act of ethno-centrism 
and domination. 
represented by the likes of the preamble to 
the Canadian Charter ofRights and Free- 
dom~? Do Chief Seattle's words render 
this impossible? Are we travelling along a 
different road, one which doesn't need 
formal written declarations to convince 
ourselves of what kinds of societies we 
are? Should we even try to do things this 
way? Who are we trying toplease in doing 
so? Is is inevitable that Aboriginal tradi- 
tions and customs have to take the form of 
'rights' which are broughtto courts, proven 
to exist then enforced? Isn't the funda- 
mental problem here the fact that every- 
thing has to be adjusted to fit the terms of 
the dominant system? 
I view the problems in the Aboriginal 
Peoples-human rights area as further ev- 
idence of the fact that the dominant cul- 
ture has never recognized Aboriginal 
Peoples as distinct Peoples and cultures. I 
suppose that the exclusion or repression 
of the "Aboriginal fact" of Canada in the 
present Constitution Act in a strange way 
bolsters the idea that Aboriginal Peoples 
are sovereign and distinct (yet entrapped) 
nations. Unless there was a conscious 
strategy of "ignore them and they'll go 
away," one would presume more ink 
would have been spilt on setting out the 
nature of the relationship between the 
Crown and theFust Peoples of Canada; or 
at least on mentioning it more directly 
than in two perfunctory sections in the 
Constitution Act. 
Larger questions loom over all of these 
problems. What does it mean for Aborigi- 
nal Peoples to advance claims enveloped 
in the rhetoric of human rights? While 
there is no question that there are serious 
human problems in Aboriginal communi- 
ties which seem to warrant redress as 
'human rights' violations, are such claims 
too piecemeal? Is there a difference be- 
tween having discrete 'rights' incremen- 
tally recognized, and being recognized as 
aPeople? What alternative to rights-based 
claims are available? In the very prag- 
matic-oriented work of human rights 
lawyers and activists in Canada, a dis- 
course about litigation strategies and le- 
gal doctrines, there hardly seems to be an 
opportunity to stop and consider these 
kinds of questions about Aboriginal rights 
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. I wonder to what extent those 
who support struggles for the recognition 
of Aboriginal rights have really consid- 
ered these issues? 
Generally, we have never really had to 
address these problems during the first 
five years of the Charter because we were 
preoccupied with negotiations to recog- 
nize (both within the Charter and within 
another specific section the Constitution 
Act) the 'right to self-g~vernrnent.'~ When 
these negotiations failed miserably at the 
final meeting of First Ministers in 1986, a 
failure which was something of a fore- 
gone conclusion given that Aboriginal 
Peoples were never seen as equal parties 
in the negotiation process from the begin- 
ning (instead we were given special 
'observer' status), people returned to the 
Charter and the vague provision on 
Aboriginal Rights in section 35 of the 
Constitution Act to consider legal chal- 
lenges and claims based upon these pro- 
visions. It is my belief that questions 
regarding which forums and laws are es- 
pecially urgent now and can hardly be 
avoided any longer, especially in light of 
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the fact that Aboriginal Peoples are turn- 
ing more so to the Charter for recognition 
of their rights vis-a-vis the Canadian 
Crown, and perhaps more disturbingly, 
turning to the C b t e r  to fight out internal 
battles in communities. 
I would like to explore some of the 
layers of contradiction or conflict which 
are raised in the context of Aboriginal 
Peoples' claims and the Charter, and de- 
scribe briefly an effort to meet one aspect 
of these contradictions which has been 
made by Aboriginal women through the 
Native Women's Association of Canada. 
The views put forward here are my own, 
many of which have been developed in 
the courseof advising theNative Women's 
Association of Canada on human rights 
matters in recent years. I havebeen greatly 
influenced in these questions by situations 
facing the Association and its constituents, 
and by both my mixed education and 
ancestry? I don't propose to consider in 
any detail traditional and customary prac- 
tices of specific Aboriginal Peoples, both 
for reasons of the limits of space here and 
because I have reservations about the 
extent to which knowledge about these 
matters can be transmitted in such a 
medium. There is valuable information 
on Iroquois customs and the idea of rights 
in the introductory article in this collec- 
tion entitled, "Our World According to 
Osennontion and Skonagan1eh:ri" (p. 6). 
The Origins of Human Rights 
While it might seem obvious that human 
rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms are incompatible with 
Aboriginal culture and traditions, it is 
helpful to trace the origin of the idea of 
human rights in the modem era in order to 
locate the differences here. The Anglo- 
American concept of rights was set out, 
for the most part, by two 17th cenhuy 
English political theorists, Thomas Hob- 
bes and John L ~ k e . ~  Locke is the more 
famous of the two on these matters. He 
developed a theory of 'natural rights' - 
later 'human' came to be substituted for 
'natural,' after the recognition (post-Holo- 
caust) that Peoples are capable of barbaric 
actions in the name of what is 'natural.' 
Locke's theory of natural rights was based 
around his idea that every man (and 
emphasis should be on man becauseLocke 
is also famous for his theory that society 
was naturally patriarchal) possesses aright 
to private property, or the right to own 
property. This right, he suggested, flowed 
from the fact the human beings are God's 
property ('God' as in the preamble to the 
~anau?ian Charter). He argued that people 
enter into 'civil society' for the central, 
and negatively conceived, purpose of 
protecting their right to private property 
against random attack. 
The idea of the absolute right to prop- 
erty, as an exclusive zone of ownership, 
capable of being transmitted through the 
family (through males according to a 
doctrine called 'primogenitor'), is the 
cornerstone of the idea of rights - the 
idea that there is a zone of absolute indi- 
vidual right where the individual can do 
what he chooses: "The right is a loaded 
gun that the right holder may shoot at will 
in his corner of town." It doesn't take 
much of a stretch of the imagination to see 
where slavery and the subordination of 
women found legitimacy in the Anglo- 
American tradition - with absolute 
ownership of propew, and autonomous 
domains, 'naturally' rights will extend 
"even to another person's body."10 
Although there is no pan-Aboriginal 
culture of iron-clad system of beliefs, this 
notion of rights based on individual 
ownership is antithetical to the widely- 
shared understanding of creation and ste- 
wardship responsibilities of First Nations 
Peoples for the land, or for Mother Earth. 
Moreover, to my knowledge, there are no 
notions among Aboriginal Nations of 
living together for the purposes of pro- 
tecting an individual i nms t  in property. 
Aboriginal life has been set out in stories 
handed down through generations and in 
customary laws sometimes represented 
by warnpum belts, sacred pipes, medicine 
bundles, mdmckpaintings. For example, 
the teachings of the Four Directions is that 
life is based on four principles - trust, 
kindness, sharing and strength. While these 
are, responsibilities which each person 
owes to others, they represent the larger 
function of social life- that is, to honour 
and respect Mother Earth. There is no 
equivalent of 'rights' here because there 
is no equivalent to the ownership of pri- 
vate property. The collective or commu- 
nal bases of Aboriginal life does not really 
have a parallel to individual rights; they 
are in commensurable. To try to explain to 
an Elder that, under Canadian law, there 
are carefully worked-over doctrines per- 
taining to who owns every square inch of 
the country, the sky, the ocean, and even 
the moon, would provoke disbelief and 
profound sadness. 
The Structure of the Canadiun Charter 
Nevertheless, the Canadian human 
rights system, having been distanced in 
time and space somewhat from its origin 
and conceptual basis in the theories about 
the right to individual ownership to prop- 
erty, seems little less foreign, especially 
since so much is said of Aboriginal mat- 
ters in the context of human rights. Some 
writers even argue that in Canada, the 
Charter recognized certain collective 
rights, such as Aboriginal rights, and not 
merely individual rights. However, my 
reading of the law leads me to believe that 
the individual property basis of human 
rights is still entirely with us and is 
revealed clearly in the text of the Cana- 
dian Charter, as well as in recent cases 
which have been decided under the Char- 
ter. The language of the Charter refers to 
the human rights enjoyed by 'every citi- 
zen of Canada,' 'every one,' 'every indi- 
vidual,' 'any person,' etc. The section of 
the Charter on enforcement applies to 
"[alny one whose rights or freedoms ... 
have been infringed," permitting them to 
apply to a court for the order the court 
considers appropriate in the circumstances 
- almost always the singular subject. 
The extent to which a human rights law 
set out in such individualist terms could 
ever either (i) be interpreted as including 
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acollective understanding of rights, or (ii) 
lead to judges acknowledging that other 
Peoples might not base their social rela- 
tions on these individual 'rights' notions, 
is highly questionable. There is nothing 
strong enough in the Charter to allow for 
either a collectivist idea of rights (or re- 
sponsibilities), if such atheory is conceiv- 
able, or toleration of a community organ- 
ized aroundcollective values. When cases 
involving Aboriginal Peoples come be- 
fore the courts, it is doubtful that different 
standards of legal analysis will be ap- 
plied. Already the case law has taken a 
disturbing course from the viewpoint of 
Aboriginal Peoples. 
With shades of private property notions 
in mind, the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the recent Morgentaler case on abortion, 
suggested that "the rights guaranteed in 
the Charter erect around each individual, 
metaphorically speaking, an invisible 
fence over which the state will not be 
allowed to trespass. The role of the courts 
is to map out, piece by piece, the parame- 
ters of the fence."" In an earlier decision, 
involving Aboriginal persons, the Federal 
Court of Canada took the view that "in the 
absence of legal provisions to the con- 
brary, the interests of individual persons 
will be deemed to have precedence over 
collective rights. In the absence of law to 
contrary, this must be as true of Indian 
Canadians as of others."12 
Even in the area of language rights - 
an area said to be a cornerstones of col- 
lective rights in the Charter - the Su- 
preme Court of Canada in the recent case 
involving Quebec's former Bill 101 has 
indicated that the basic understanding of 
this right is somehow both an individual 
and a collective one: "Language itself 
indicates, a means by which a people may 
express its cultural identity. It is also the 
means by which the individual expresses 
his or her personal identity and sense of 
individuality."13 How to go about recon- 
ciling these two aspects when they con- 
flict is no easy task, and the Court gives 
little guidance here on its view of collec- 
tive rights - except to say that the indi- 
vidual's rights to speak their language 
must be protected at law against the 
community's prohibition of it. 
Even in the area of equality rights, as 
recognized in section 15 of the Charter, 
the text applies to "every individual." 
This provision has been interpreted by the 
courts not as a general recognition of the 
idea of equality (which if read as 'same- 
ness' would be deeply disturbing to 
Aboriginal people), but simply as a prin- 
ciple relating to the application of given 
laws. In a recent equality case, the Su- 
preme Court of Canada stated that section 
15, "is not a general guarantee of equality, 
it does not provide for equality between 
individuals or groups within society in a 
general or abstract sense, nor does it 
impose on individuals or groups an obli- 
gation to accord quality treatment to 
others. It is concerned with the applica- 
tion of the law." l4 The scope for Aborigi- 
nal rights claims under section 15 is lim- 
ited, even if such a course was seen as 
desirable by Aboriginal leaders. 
Moreover, we can begin to see the 
broader implications of these cases for 
Aboriginal Peoples or Aboriginal claims. 
It is difficult to move in a certain direction 
as a People if individuals can challenge 
collective decisions based on infringe- 
ments of their individual rights and if 
collective goals will not be understood or 
prioritized. Some people may view this as 
the triumph of democracy, but it makes 
the preservation of a different culture and 
the pursuit of collective political goals 
almost impossible. 
In Aboriginal communities where cus- 
tomary political and spiritual institutions 
are the guiding force (even alongside the 
imposed Indian Act system of Band 
Councils), such as the Haudenosaunee of 
the Iroquois Confederates, recourse to an 
individual-rights basedlaw like the Char- 
ter could result in further weakening the 
cultural identity of the community. This 
could take one of two forms: either a 
member of the community would chal- 
lenge Aboriginal laws based on individ- 
ual rights protections in the Cheater argu- 
ing that they have not been respected by 
their government (an internal challenge); 
or a non-Aboriginal person could chal- 
lenge the laws of an Aboriginal gov- 
ernment on the basis that they do not 
conform with charter standards (an ex- 
ternal challenge). 
In the case of an external challenge, for 
example, on the basis of voting or candi- 
dacy rights where a non- Aboriginal mm- 
plainant argued that they could not vote or 
stand for elections in an Aboriginal mm- 
munity because of cultural restrictions, 
the court would be given the authority to 
decide an important part of the future of 
an Aboriginal community. It would have 
to consider the protections of Aboriginal 
rights in the Charter and weigh these 
against the individual right to vote recog- 
nizedin section 3. ShouldCanadian courts 
(and non- Aboriginal judges) have author- 
ity in these cases? Given the highly indi- 
vidualistic basis of the Charter, andof the 
history of human rights, would the collec- 
tive Aboriginal right stand a chance? I 
doubt it. As the Assembly of First Nations 
argued, before the Parliamentary Com- 
mittee on Aboriginal Affairs in 1982: 
"[as] Indian people we cannot afford to 
have individual rights override collective 
rights. Our societies have never been struc- 
tured that way, unlike yours, and that is 
where the clash comes... If you isolate the 
individual rights from the collective rights, 
then you are heading down another path 
that is even more discriminato ry... The 
Canadian Charter of Rights is in conflict 
with our philosophy and culture ...."l5 
The other possible challenge, the in- 
ternal challenge, where a member of an 
Aboriginal community felt dissatisfied 
with a particular course of action the 
Aboriginal government was taking, and 
turned to the Charter for the recognition 
of a right, is equally if not more worri- 
some. This kind of challenge would be a 
dangerous opening for a Canadian court 
to rule on individual versus collective 
rights vis-a-vis Aboriginal Peoples, it 
would also break down community meth- 
ods of dispute-resolution and restoration. 
Here, the example of the Indian Civil 
RightsActI6 in the United States is instruc- 
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tive. This act, based on the idea that pro- 
tections for the American Bill of Rights 
should be extended to Aboriginal com- 
munities, along with the establishment of 
tribal courts which would have the same 
function as American courts generally, 
has been greatly criticized by Aboriginal 
people as imposing alien ways of life. 
As two noted scholars suggest: 
In philosophical terms, it is much 
easier to describe the impact of the... 
Act. Traditional Indian society under- 
stood itself as a complex of responsi- 
bilities and duties. The [Act] merely 
transposed this belief into a society 
based on rights against government 
and eliminated any sense of responsi- 
bility that the people might have felt for 
one another. Granted that many of the 
customs that made duties and responsi- 
bilities a serious matter of individual 
action had eroded badly in the decades 
since the tribes had agreed to move to 
reservations, the impact of the [AcQ 
was to make these responsibilities 
impossible to perform because the act 
inserted the trial court as an institution 
between the people and their responsi- 
bilities. People did not have to confront 
one another before their community 
and resolve their problems; they had 
only tofile suit in tribal court.17 
The lessons of the American Indian 
Civil Rights Act, and of the establishment 
of tribal courts, are important ones in light 
of the Charter. If internal disputes are 
brought before Canadian courts, it will 
seriously undermine the Aboriginal sys- 
tem of government based on responsibil- 
ity (like the Four Directions) and inter- 
Dose a system of individual-based rights. 
it also has the effect of encour- 
aging people to go outside the 
community, and outside of cus- 
tom, to settle disputes in for- 
mal courts - instead of hav- 
ing to deal with a problem 
within the community. 
This might sound like a hard 
line to take, especially when 
one considers the extent to 
which customs and traditional 
methods of governance and 
dispute-resolution have been 
dislodged in Aboriginal com- 
munities after more than a 
century of life under the In- 
dian Act. The experience of 
gender-based discrimination 
was employed as a technique of as- 
similation up until the 1985 amendments 
to the Indian Act (many see the gender- 
based discriminatory provisions as hav- 
ing continuing effect despite the arnend- 
ments), and scarred many Aboriginal 
communities as male-dominated Band 
councils frequently sided against women 
and with the Canadian government in the 
belief that to do otherwise would under- 
mine the Crown's trust responsibility for 
Aboriginal Peoples. 
As a consequence, women were forced 
to go outside the community to resolve 
the injustices of gender-discrimination, 
so cases were brought under the Cana- 
dian Bill of Rights and eventually under 
the UnitedNations Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Changes were made to 
the Indian Act, but many of the after- 
effects of gender-discrimination still 
plague Aboriginal communities, includ- 
ing problems associated with women re- 
turning to communities, and being able to 
take up residence, educate their children, 
share in social services, and receive per 
capital payments from resource exploita- 
tion on Aboriginal lands. 
Communities have been slow to ad- 
dress questions related to the aftermath of 
gender-discrimination in the Indian Act, 
and the mechanisms available to resolve 
disputes according to customary prac- 
tices are not necessarily available. This 
places a great deal of pressure on Aborigi- 
nal communities, which could lead to 
cases being taken to Canadian courts 
pursuatlt to the Charter for recognition of 
rights against Aboriginal governments. 
As a result of concern over what this 
could lead to, in light of the individual- 
based notions of rights under Canadian 
law, and in light of lessons derived from 
the United States experience with the 
Indian CivilRighrsAct, Alimxie women 
have been warking on projects to encour- 
age the development of First Nations laws 
in areas like 'citizenship' and human rights 
and responsibilities - laws based, as far 
as possible, on inherent First Nation ju- 
risdiction and customary practices. 
An Alternative Approach: First 
Nations Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Laws 
The Native Women's Association of 
Canada has addressed questions relating 
to gender-discrimination in the Indian 
Act, and related problems in Aboriginal 
communities since thelate 1970s. In 1985, 
when amendments to the Indian Act aimed 
at eliminating gender-discrimination were 
finally passed, the Native Women's As- 
sociation took the position that, while 
Aboriginal women could support the end 
of unfair bias against women, they could 
not simply support the Federal govern- 
ment's efforts to 'improve' the Indian Act 
and the extension of legislative control 
over the lives of Aboriginal Peoples 
through its paternalistic provisions. Con- 
sequently, the Association turned its at- 
tention to the development of a 'First 
Nation Citizenship Code,' or a model law 
which would address the issues of mem- 
bership or citizenship in a First Nation, 
but would base its principles and jurisdic- 
tion not on Canadian law, but on the 
inherent jurisdiction of First Nations to 
regulate citizenship as practices since time 
immemorial. 
The model codes were dis- 
tributed to every Aboriginal 
community in Canada with a 
letter encouraging communi- 
ties to take a First Nations 
approach to citizenship, and 
not an Indian Act approach, 
and to set uplocal mechanisms 
based, as much as possible, on 
customary principles for set- 
tling disputes, so that prob- 
lems regarding citizenship 
could be addressed in the 
community itself and not in 
Canadian courts. As it became 
clear that citizenship was not 
the only area of concern in 
communities (although the 
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issue of Indian status was by far the most 
divisive), it was evident that some other 
efforts would need to be expended to dis- 
courage internal challenges of Aboriginal 
government actions getting into Cana- 
dian courts under the Chmter. In 1986 the 
Native Women's Association of Canada 
began to consider the development of 
another model law, parallel to thecitizen- 
ship Codes, which would be a First Na- 
tions human rights and responsibilities 
law. 
It appears that this Code, which at the 
time of writing is still in thedraft stages,will 
be based on the inherent jurisdiction of 
First Nations to make laws for their 
Peoples. It will include a very loosely and 
generously worded part on human rights 
andresponsibilities, corresponding to four 
groups of rights and responsibilities which 
come from the teachings of the Four Di- 
rections. Hence, there are the following 
responsibilities and rights: 
(i) kindness - social rights 
(ii) honesty - political and civil rights 
(iii) sharing - economic rights 
(iv) strength - cultural rights. 
For example, the responsibility and 
rights category of strength/cultural rights 
would include provisions on the right to 
pursue traditional occupations, the right 
to education in Aboriginal languages, the 
right to customary marriage and adop- 
tions, the right to participate in ceremo- 
nies according to the laws and traditions 
of the Nation, and, most importantly, the 
recognition of the fundamental impor- 
tance of Elders and spiritual leaders in the 
preservation of ancestral and customary 
law and in the health and well-being of 
the community as a whole. 
The provisions on the model law de- 
veloped by the Native Women's Associ- 
ationon dispute-resolution pro- 
vide options for a particular 
community to consider in cre- 
ating a law which fits in its 
customs andaspirations. These 
include mediation, the estab- 
lishment of a Human Rights 
Committee, and a Council of 
Elders. Also included are op- 
tions for setting up methods to 
deal with conflicts on aregional 
basis (e.g. an Iroquois or 
Ojibway council of Elders). It 
is hoped that the work of the 
Association will contribute to 
the development of commu- 
nity laws and less formal community 
solutions to reduce the possibilities that 
individual members of First Nations com- 
munities will have to go outside their 
communities (to foreign courts) for re- 
dress of grievances. It seems that the 
development of community codes is the 
best available solution to the problems in 
communities and to the threat of the (fur- 
ther) imposition of a Western indi- 
vidualistic human rights system on Abo- 
riginal Communities. 
Future Challenges 
The work of the Native Women's As- 
sociation of Canada really only addresses 
the problem of internal challenges based 
on the Charter by members of First Na- 
tions communities. It does not attempt to 
deal with other areas of concern, such as 
external challenges, or claims brought by 
non-Aboriginal peoples pursuant to the 
Charter, calling into question the collec- 
tive basis of Aboriginal communities.ls 
Even claims brought by Aboriginal 
communities against the Federal Govern- 
ment based on provisions of the Charter 
seem to present a dangerous opportunity 
for the court to take a restrictive view of 
collective-based community goals. Any 
case which presents a Canadian court 
with the opportunity to balance or weigh 
an individual right against a collective 
right, or Aboriginal collectiveunderstand- 
ing of community, will be an opportunity 
to delimit the recognition of Aboriginal 
Peoples as distinct cultures. 
This is something different than deal- 
ing on an equal footing with Aboriginal 
Peoples about historic claims and cultural 
differences which have to be addressed 
and settled. These cases permit the court 
to say "yes, we do have jurisdiction ova 
you, and we will decide what is best for 
you under Canadian law." It is not that 
different from the imposed system of rule 
under the Indian Act; except in Charter 
cases, the court can cloak its decision in 
the rhetoric of democratic freedom, eman- 
cipation, multiculhlralism and human 
rightsfor '&Canadians.' The only way to 
really consider the political and cultural 
differences between Aboriginal Peoples 
and the Canadian state is through discus- 
sions which are quasi-international so that 
the respective 'sovereignty' of the parties 
will be respected. 
Aboriginal Peoples have been trying to 
pursue this (international) course during 
the past decade. The United Nations has 
established a special Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations to consider the 
human rights violations (really historic 
claims under international law) of Indige- 
nous Peoples from around the globe. 
During the past seven years, there have 
been six meetings of the Working group, 
and recently efforts have been directed at 
the development of a United Nations 
Declaration on Indigenous Rights. Al- 
though Aboriginal Peoples have been 
participating quite actively in ths p m s s  
of development of a United Nations 
Declaration, once again, we are really on 
the outside of the United Nations system. 
Nevertheless, certain States which are part 
of the United Nations structure have been 
willing to advocate for the recognition of 
Indigenous Rights in a Declaration.lg 
The matters dealt with in the proceed- 
ings of the Working Group and in the 
Draft Declaration can hardly be ignored, 
when one considers the extent to which 
they are present in all areas of the globe. 
As one noted international scholar has 
suggested. "[tlhe peoples of 
entrapped nations are a sleep- 
ing giant in the workings of 
power pol i t i~s ."~~ A cor- 
nerstone of an eventual decla- 
ration would have to be, from 
the Aboriginal perspective, a 
recognition and explicit ex- 
tension of self-determination 
to Indigenous Peoples under 
International law. There are 
persuasive arguments that, 
even without a specific decla- 
ration, international law al- 
ready recognizes the right of 
all Peoples (including Abo- 
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riginal Peoples) to self-determination. from international society, manifested in dian discussion process where, unlike the 
Self-determination is something dif- the work of non-government organiza- series of discussims held on Canadian 
ferent than self-government, although it tions, women's movements, and sympa- constitutional amendments, AM- 
could include the latter. Self-government thetic States. The Canadian government Peoples are equal participants in the proc- 
(which has been the ~innacle of all human and Canadian people could do much to ess, along with dK Prime Mini- and 
rights discussions in the Canadian con- assist the international process if the perham Provincial Premiers. 
text) implies that AboriginalPeoples were Government would simply recognize In the meantime, Aboriginal women 
not previously able to govern themselves, Aboriginal Peoples as distinct Peoples will continue to do what can be done to 
because they were not at an advanced with different but equally legitimate cul- ensure that Aboriginal communities are 
enough stageof civilization, can now take tures and ways of life. This can't be done governed by customary laws and prac- 
on some responsibility for their own af- through Canadian courts and in the rheto- tices, through the development of First 
fairs.21 Very few people make a distinc- ric of Canadian human rights - it has to Nations laws, and through the political 
tion between self-government and self- be done through a joint Aboriginal-Cana- and spiritual voice of the Native Women's 
determination. In a recent report Association of Canada as guided 
by the Canadian Bar Association by its Elders and affiliated 
special committee on Native jus- women's organizations. 
tice, the idea of self-government 
is used throughout without any 
'See for instance Bamlomd 
distinction as to its historical con- de Las Casa, The Tears of the 
text or political  implication^.^ Indians (tr. Phillips, 1656), and 
On this point, again Aboriginal Vittoria, De Indis Et De Juri 
women in Canada, through the Belli Refectiones. (tr. Nys, 
voice of the Native Women's 1917). 
Association, have made their Here I am mindful of the rise 
position in support of self-deter- of the museums of so-called 
mination over self-government 'natural history' which were 
quite clear.23 dedicated to the study of prirni- 
In the inte.mational context, the tive peoples and the collection 
draft declaration on Indigenous of cultural objects for display as 
rights is silent on the issue of curiosities. It was not only cul- 
self-determination. It contains tural or spiritual objects that were 
many disturbing provisions on collected during the rise of the 
lesser notions like 'autonomy ... museum and curatorial science, 
in local affairs' and the 'right to but also human specimens. For 
exist.' While these might seem example, see Harper, Give Me 
progressive in some situations My Father's Body (1986), or a 
where the very life of Aboriginal recent article in Harper' S maga- 
People is systematically threat- zine (March 1989) suggesting 
ened on a daily basis, the provi- that the New York Museum of 
sions do not go far enough in Natural History has the skeletal 
recognizing Aboriginal Peoples remains of 15,000 Aboriginal 
as distinct cultures and political persons in its collection, each 
entities, equally as capable of carefully boxed and numbered. 
governing and making decisions See Ruth Benedict, Patterns 
as European sovereigns, except of Culture (1935). 
with different political and cul- For just a few examples, the 
tural goals. prohibition of the potlatch under 
A great deal more work will the Indian Act, the burning of 
have to be done in the next few the Longhouses of the Iroquois 
years to ensure that the text of the Confederacy at the turn of the 
Draft Declaration is one which century, and the convictions of 
will recognize Indigenous the Innu in Labrador for protest- 
Peoples as legitimate, though ing low-level military flights 
different, governments and cul- over their territory. 
tures. The only way to do this, in Aboriginal rights are men- 
international law and in national tioned only twice within the text 
law, is through a recognition of of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
self-determination. To do this The first is in the Charter, in 
will require broad-based support section 25 interpretative provi- 
156 CANADIAN WOMAN STUDIES/LES CAHIERS DE LA FEMME 
sion which provides (in part) ter determines whether or 
that "[tlhe guarantee in this not they have reached a 
Charter of certain rights and sufficient stage of 'devel- 
freedoms shall not be con- opment.' 
strued to abrogate or dero- " See, Aboriginal Rights 
gate from any aboriginal, in Canada: An Agenda for 
treaty or otherrights or free- Action (1988). 
doms that pertain to the 23 They have done so 
aboriginal peoples of Can- through a special declara- 
ada ...;" the second is in Part tion adopted (unanimously) 
I1 of the Constitution Act in at an Annual Meeting 
section 35 which recognized (Whitehorse, 1986). 
and affms "existing abo- 
riginal and treaty rights." 
Of course, not all Abo- 
riginal Peoples participated 
in this process of nego- 
tiation. Many prceived it as a process l7 Deloria and Lytle, The Nations 
designed to compromise historic claims Within (1984). 
and treaties in a document (the Canadian l8 Section 25 of the Charter mentioned 
Constitution) which would suit the needs in footnote 5 above is supposed to guard 
of the Federal and Provincial govern- against such challenges, but it is difficult 
ments first, and Aboriginal Peoples sec- to predict whether the court will take a 
ond. generous view in favour of collective 
' Mixed education meaning both for- rights, especially when everything else in 
mal legal training, and the significant the Charter, and in the history of human 
teachings of my Grandmothers, Sisters, rights, seems to be directed to the protec- 
and the Lodge; and mixed ancestry - tionof theindividual from thecommunity Mary Ellen Turpel is Aki-Kwe. Born of 
Cree and Anglo-Canadian, which seems or government. a Cree father and an Anglo-Canadian 
to focus the mind on contradictions like 19 The scandinavian states have been mother, Mary Ellen Turpel was raised in 
those discussed in this article. particularly supportive here. southern Ontario. Mary Ellen is currently a Professor at Dalhousie Law School , In, respectively, Leviathan (1651), " Natural Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova 
and Two Treaties on Civil Government munities," in The Rights of Indigenous Scotia. This is Ms. Turpel's first year 
(1690). Peoples in International Law (1987). teaching full-time. She completed her 
Unger, Critical Legal Studies 21 The idea that Aboriginal commu- Graduate Studies, inInternationalLega1 
Movement (1986). nities are not sufficiently advanced enough Studies at Harvard Law School, Cam- 
'' Hobbes, Leviathan. to control their own affairs is recognized bridge, Massachusetts, in May 1989. Ms. 
l1 Madame Justice Wilson writing in in the Indian Act, where, under the provi- Turpel received a Masters of Internu- 
Morgentaler, Smoling & Scotty, The sions for Band Council control over fi- tional Law from the University of Cam- 
Queen & Attorney General of Canada nancial decisions, a band can make laws bridge, England in 1988. In addition to winning numer- [l9881 lS.C.R. 164. for financial issues only when the Minis- ous awards and scholarships in 
l2 Mr. Justice MacGuigan the law field, Ms. Turpel has 
writing in Bovery, Canada, acted as an advisor to the De- 
119861 35 N.R. 305. partment of IndianlNorthern 
l3 Attorney General of Quebec Affairs and the Indian Law Re- 
& Brown & Ford & McKenna et source Centre. Ms. Turpel has 
a1 v. La Chassure Brown's Inc. worked and volunteered for the Native Women's Association of (as yet unreported). Canada, and the Ontario Native 
l4 Mr. Justice Mclntyre, Law Women's Association. She is an 
Society ofBritish Columbia et a1 equally serious student of tradi- 
v. Andrews et a1 (unreported), tional law, clan teachings and 
emphasis added. Nishnawbe good life. 
l5 Minutes and Proceedings, Aki-Kwe is an auntie, sister, 
House of Commons Standing daughter and friend - roles 
committee on Aboriginal Af- which she finds more important 
fairs, Evidence no. 58 (Septem- than her other titles. Aki-Kwe 
ber 29,1982). believes it is time to turn our at- tention to our environment, our 
l6 U.S., Statutes at Large, relationships and learning to live 
82:77. peacefully. 
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